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DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION: THE CONSIDERATION
Of RACE IN HIRING UNIVERSITY FACULTY

Suzanne E. Eckes'

I. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Supreme Court firmly established that a diverse student
body is a compelling state interest in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 1 Grutter v. Bollinger, 2 and Gratz v. Bollinger. 3 The
answer, however, to whether a diverse faculty constitutes a compelling
interest remains unclear. This paper explores whether the arguments
used in student body diversity cases may extend to university faculty
diversity as a compelling state interest. Race-conscious faculty affirmative
action programs require different legal considerations depending on
whether the programs aim to achieve university faculty diversity or to
remedy past discrimination.
Race-conscious affirmative action cases reviewed by the Supreme
Court can be divided into the following three categories: the
consideration of race for diversity purposes, including viewpoint
diversity; the consideration of race to correct racial imbalance; and the
consideration of race to remedy past discrimination. In the context of
higher education, the cases focused on student body diversity. In the
context of employment, the cases generally focused on remedying past
discrimination. 4
In order to examine diversity, remedial interest, and racial balance
arguments in race-conscious affirmative action programs for hiring
faculty, an analysis of several key race-conscious student admissions and
employment cases is necessary. Specifically, before Bakke, Grutter, and
Gratz, there were a series of public employment affirmative action cases
that addressed past discrimination and racial imbalance. These cases
provide guidance to institutions seeking to use race as a factor in hiring
faculty members. After comparing the diversity rationale cases with the
· Stozanne F. Eckes, ).ll., Ph.D. is an assistant professor in Educational Leadership and Policy Studies
at Indiana University. The author would like to thank Martha McCarthy and Erica Christie f(>r their
helpful comments on this paper.

Regents of" the U. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (19/H).
Grutter v. Bollirzger, 5.>9 U.S. 306 (2003).
3. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
1.

2.

4. Some employment cases have addressed racial balancing as well as past discrimination.
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remedial interest rationale cases, this paper discusses other decisions that
focus specifically on race and faculty hiring. Based upon these analyses,
this paper concludes with an exploration of policy arguments concerning
whether race should be considered in hiring faculty.
II. SUPREME COURT RACE-BASED CASES: WHAT STANDARD OF REVIEW Is
APPLIED?

The Court applies one of three standards when considering the
constitutionality of a government action, with strict scrutiny being the
most difficult standard to satisfy. 5 When considering race in the context
of employment or education, race-conscious policies are subject to strict
scrutiny in Equal Protection Clause cases. 6 The government must show
that the action is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. 7
For example, when hiring university faculty for remedial reasons, the
university must demonstrate a compelling state interest in remedying the
impact of past discrimination and show the hiring plan is narrowly
tailored to remedy the impact of the past discrimination. 8 Likewise, in
using race as a criterion to achieve faculty diversity, a university must
demonstrate that a diverse faculty is a compelling state interest and then
establish that the race-conscious plan is narrowly tailored to achieve the
goal of diversity. 9
III. STUDENT BODY DIVERSITY CASES: DO THESE DECISIONS EXTEND TO
FACULTY DIVERSITY?

Since 1978, institutions of higher education have relied upon Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke to justify faculty and student diversity
programs. This reliance on Bakke has increased due to the recent Grutter
and Gratz decisions. Although the Supreme Court solely addressed the
issue of student diversity in these cases, some scholars contend the
holdings extend to faculty diversity because the decisions contain no
language restricting this issue to the student body. 10
5. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law, 605-55 (14th
ed., found. Press 2001 ).
6. Id.
7.

See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995).

8. See Suzanne E. Eckes, Race-Conscious Admissions Programs: Where Do Universities Go
from Gratz and Grutter? 33 j.L. & Educ. 21,23 (2004).
9. Id.
10. See )oint Statement of Constitutional Law Scholars, Reaffirming Diversity: A Legal Analysis
of the University of' Michigan Affirmative Actions Cases 22-25 (Civ. Rights Project at Harv. U. 2003)
[hereinafter joint Statement].
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The Supreme Court recognized that a diverse student body is a
compelling state interest in Bakke. 11 Here, the University of California at
Davis Medical School reserved a specific number of admissions slots for
minority students. 12 The Supreme Court struck down the affirmative
action plan, holding that the use of a quota, or reserving a certain
number of seats for minorities, was unconstitutional. 13 Although the
Court found the University's race-conscious admissions plan was
unconstitutional, Justice Powell's plurality opinion held that California's
interest in maintaining a diverse student body was sufficiently
compelling. 14 Justice Powell stated that a diverse student body "is a
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher
education." 15
Despite the Bakke opinion, universities had insufficient guidance as
to what extent race could be used in admissions or in faculty hiring.
Several courts relied on Justice Powell's concept of the use of race as one
of many factors, or as a plus factor, in university admissions. 16 Some
courts even extended Justice Powell's approach to employmentincluding faculty hiring. 17 The difficulty interpreting Bakke's approved
consideration of race as a plus factor was subsequently resolved in
Grutter and Gratz.
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court confirmed Justice Powell's
holding that student body diversity is a compelling state interest, and
therefore, race could be used in university admissions. 18 In Grutter, the
majority reasoned Bakke emphasized a "[s]tate has a substantial interest
that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions
program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic
origin." 19 The majority noted that "numerous studies show that student
body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and 'better prepares students
for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares

11. 438 U.S. at 310-12.
12. Id. at 289.
13. Jd. at 289-99.
14. Jd. at 310-12.
15. Jd. at 311-12.
16. See DeRonde v. Regents of the U. of Cal., 625 P.2d 220,224-25 (Cal. 1981); McDonald v.
Hogness, 598 P.2d 707,712 (Wash. 1979).
17. See Higgins v. Vallejo, 823 F.2d 352, 357-59 (9th Cir. 1987) (relying on justice Powell's
Bakke rationale); U. & Community College Sys. of Nev. v. Farmer, 930 P.2d 730,734-35 (Nev. 1997)
(treating justice Powell's opinion in Bakke as the decision of the Court).
18. 539 U.S. at 322-23. The Court also recognized justice Powell's opinion had served as the
"touchstone for constitutional analysis" of affirmative action programs in universities across the
country. Jd. at 323.
19. Jd. at 322-323 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320).
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them as professionals."' 20 The Court also concluded that the benefits of
diversity "are not theoretical but real, as major American businesses have
made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly global
marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse
people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints." 21
After the Court reasoned that diversity was compelling and that race
could be used as a factor, it next addressed whether the University of
Michigan Law School's program was narrowly tailored. 22 The Court
noted that "[w]hen race-based action is necessary to further a compelling
governmental interest, such action does not violate the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection so long as the narrow-tailoring
requirement is also satisfied." 23 Because of the holistic-or many
factored-approach to selecting the student body, the University of
Michigan's affirmative action plan was deemed narrowly tailored. 24 This
holistic approach was quite different from the quota system used in
Bakke. 25
In contrast to the Law School's program in Grutter, in Gratz the
admissions program automatically distributed 20 points to every
applicant from an "underrepresented minority" group. 26 In the written
statement, the Court stressed Justice Powell's reasoning in Bakke would
not permit "any single characteristic" to automatically ensure an
"identifiable contribution to a university's diversity," 27 but rather called
for individual consideration. 28 Unlike the admissions program in
Grutter, the undergraduate program in Gratz did not individually
consider the students. 29 Accordingly, the Court held that the
undergraduate affirmative action policy was not narrowly tailored and
therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Title VI, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 30
A well-reasoned argument can be made to extend the Court's student
body diversity holdings to faculty diversity contexts. 31 It is important to

20. !d. at 330 (quoting Br. for Am. Educ. Research Assoc. as Amici Curiae at .l (feb. IH, 2003)
(available at 2003 WL 398292)).
21. Id. at 330-331.
22.

Id. at 333-43.

23. Id. at 327.
24.

!d. at 338-343.

25.

Sceid at337-3R.

26. 539 U.S. at 270.
27.

Id. at 271.

/d. at 270-75.
!d.
30. /d. at 275.
31. See jonathan Alger, When Color-Blind Is Color-Bland: Ensuring Faculty Diversity in
28.

29.
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note that Grutter and Gratz focused on diversity and not the remedial
interest argument. Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz offer strong language
supporting governmental interest in both student body and faculty
diversity. 32 In Bakke, the Court noted that student body diversity would
lead to "the robust exchange of ideas." 33 Arguably, this concept could be
applied to the robust exchange of ideas between both faculty and
students and faculty and faculty. The Grutter Court held that "[i]n order
to cultivate a set ofleaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is
necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity." 34 This concept could
also be applied to university faculty.
The Joint Statement of Constitutional Law Scholars 35 argues that
"[o]ne of the benefits of student body diversity identified by the Grutter
Court is the development of a diverse and integrated leadership that can
serve the needs of government, business, and the military." 30 In other
words, a diverse faculty can help create a network of future leaders in all
academic disciplines. Additionally, the Joint Statement noted that
The Grutter Court stressed that context is critical in strict scrutiny
analysis, and the Court may be more inclined to uphold race-conscious
policies in employment contexts that closely parallel the higher
education context, where the benefits of diversity in the workplace are
welldocumented [sic] and race is used as a "plus" factor in a nonmechanical hiring or promotion process that also considers non-racial
factors and allows applicants to compete for jobs on an equal footing. 37

By considering race as one of many factors and by using research to
document the benefits of faculty diversity, a plan may be considered
narrowly tailored.
The University's educational judgment regarding diversity and its
educational mission were honored by the Court in Grutter:' 8 The Court
stated: "Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a
degree of deference to a university's academic decisions, within
constitutionally prescribed limits. "39 This deference arguably relates to
the academic freedoms under the First Amendment, including who may
Higher Education, 10 Stan. L. & Policy Rev. 191 (1999); see also, Joint Statement, supra n. iO at 22-25
(arguing that the Michigan affirmative action decisions could extend to facultv diversity).
32. See joint Statement, supra n. 10 at 22-25.
33. 438 U.S. at 311-13.
34. 539 U.S. at 332.
35. )oint Statement, supra n.10.
36. !d. at 24.
37.

!d. at 25.

38. 539 U.S. at 328.
39.

Id.
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teach, what may be taught, and who may be admitted to study. 40 In
permitting this flexibility, the Court noted that '"good faith' on the part
of a university is 'presumed' absent 'a showing to the contrary."' 41
Moreover, under Executive Order, universities receiving federal
money are required "to take affirmative action" regarding race as an
employment factor. 42 The Supreme Court has not interpreted either the
Constitution or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit raceconscious hiring to promote faculty diversityY Indeed, until the
Supreme Court specifically decides whether a diverse faculty is a
compelling interest, one could infer that Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz
permit universities to consider race in hiring faculty.
IV. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT CASES: Do THESE DECISIONS INCLUDE
FACULTY SELECTION REMEDIAL PROGRAMS?
Remedying past discrimination has been recognized under existing
case law to support race-conscious hiring if such programs are narrowly
tailored. Before Grutter and Gratz, the Court decided a series of cases in
which a divided Court addressed the constitutionality of various raceconscious employment programs. Although the majority of these cases
were not specifically focused on faculty diversity, it is necessary to
explore the reasoning used by the Court in some of these public
employment cases to understand the Court's reasoning regarding the use
of race-conscious programs for remedial purposes. In addition to the
Equal Protection argument present in Grutter and Gratz, within the
employment context, Title VII is often at issue. Title VII does not
consider affirmative action as discrimination if the affirmative action
plan is considered valid. 44 It is important to note that an employer
aftlrmative action plan that focuses on a remedial purpose has only been
considered valid under Title VII. 45 Diversity, on the other hand, has just
been developed as a valid reason under Title VII for adopting an
aftlrmative action plan. 46

40. Patrick Linehan, Guarding the Dumping Ground: Equal Protection, Title VII and Justifying
of Race in the Hiring a( Special Educators, 2001 BYU Educ. & L.j. 179, 199 (200 1).

the Usc

41. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
42. Exec. Or. No. 11246, 3 C.P.R. 339 (1965) (reprinted as amended in 1 Affirmative Action
Compl. Man. for F. Contractors (BNA) 101, 101).
43. See Alger, supra n. 31 at 193.
44. Moniquc C. Lillard, Deborah C:. Malamud, Miranda Oshige McGowan, Charles A.
Shanor, The Effect of the University of Michigan Cases on Affirmative Action in Employment, 8
Employee Rights & Empl. Policy). 127, 136 (2004).
45.

Id. al 136-37.

46. Lillard ct al., supra n. 44.
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One of the earlier cases to address under-representation of minority
employees was United Steelworkers of America v. W eberY In this case,
the Supreme Court held that race-conscious plans may be used in job
categories in which minorities are traditionally underrepresented. 48 In
Weber, a collective bargaining agreement established a race-conscious
training program for unskilled minority workers. 49 The training program
reserved 50 percent of the spots for minority workers. 5° The Supreme
Court held that such a plan was permissible to eradicate racial
discrimination, 51 but a plan establishing rigid racial placement would be
impermissible. 5 2 It is important to note that Weber was a Title VII case.
As such, the court used a different test from the strict scrutiny test
applied in Equal Protection cases. Some of the other employment cases
discussed employed this different test for the same reasons.
Fullilove v. Klutznick 53 is another employment case that
demonstrates the Supreme Court's analysis of a race-conscious decision
to remedy past discrimination. In this case, the Supreme Court examined
the Public Works Employment Act enacted by Congress for minority
business enterprises. 54 The Court upheld, under a lesser degree of
scrutiny, the congressionally created affirmative action program that set
aside l 0 percent of government business for minority-owned
businesses. 55
Similar reasoning was applied six years later in Local 28 of Sheet
Metal Workers International Association v. EEOC, when the Supreme
Court suggested that the Constitution permits court-ordered affirmative
action to eliminate "the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination." 56
In this case, it was alleged that membership preferences were granted to
non-white workers who had not been identified as victims of unlawful
discrimination. 57 The Supreme Court noted that the district court
properly used statistical evidence to establish petitioner's non-white
membership statistical goal under the affirmative action plan and

47.

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 ( 1979).

48.

Id. at 208-09.

49.

Id. at 197.

50.

Id.

5 L I d. at 209.
52.

/d.

53.

Fullllovc v. Klutwick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).

54.

/d.

55. Id. at 453. In a plurality opinion, justice Burger noted Congress's remedial powers in this
area. Id. at 483-84.
56.
57.

Loca/28 ofSheet Metal Workers Tnt/. Assn. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,476 (1986).
Td. at 455.
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order. 5 s
In a similar case, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 59 the Supreme
Court more narrowly defined its approach when it held that genderconscious plans applied to job categories in which minorities are
traditionally underrepresented are acceptable. In Johnson, the
transportation agency adopted a plan where sex was considered in
promotions because women were underrepresented in such positions. 60
The Court upheld the plan because there was not only an imbalance of
women but because the plan, like the plan in Weber, did not excessively
harm men. 61 Further, the Court reasoned that the plan seemed to have an
end in sight. 62
Around this time, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 63 was
decided. Wygant was the only Supreme Court case dealing directly with
faculty and diversity under the remedial interest argument. The Board of
Education in Jackson, Michigan, developed a race-conscious layoff
agreement with the local teachers' union. 64 Under this plan, teacher
seniority would govern if layoffs were necessary except that "at no time
[would] there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than
the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the
layoff." 65 When layoffs became necessary, the school district disregarded
the race-conscious layoff agreement and laid off two minority teachers. 66
The two teachers and the union brought suit under the Equal Protection
Clause and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 67 In state court, the teachers
prevailed on breach of contract and the school district's arguments were
rejected. 68 As a result of the state court decision, the school district began
enforcing the race-conscious layoff plan. The laid-off non-minority
teachers brought suit in federal court challenging the plan on both Title
VII and Equal Protection grounds. 69
The district court upheld the race-conscious layoff plan under an
Equal Protection analysis as an attempt to remedy societal discrimination

58. Id. at 440-42.
59. Johnson v. Trunsp. Agency, 4RO U.S. 616 (1987).

Id. at 620-21.
Id. at 630.
62. Id. at n39-40.
63. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 476 U.S. 267 ( 19S6).
64. Id. at 270-71.
60.

61.

65. Id. at 270.
ti7.

Id. at 271.
Id.

68.

Jd. at 272.

69.

Id.

66.
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by providing minority role models in the classroom?0 The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed; the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
Equal Protection Clause claim? 1 In a five-four decision, with five
separate opinions, the Supreme Court reasoned that the school board's
interest of providing black role models and remedying the societal
discrimination that created historically white teaching staffs were not
compelling. 72
\!\Then the Court examined the remedial argument, focus was placed
on the prior discriminating practices of the school district. 73 Justice
Powell stated in the plurality opinion that the "Court had insisted upon
some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved
before allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy
such discrimination. "74 He reasoned that the plan operated "against
whites and in favor of certain minorities, and therefore constituted a
classification based on race." 75 Further, according to Justice Powell, a
policy embracing racial preferences to create minority role models could
not be upheld as legitimate? 6
Although the Supreme Court struck down the role model theory, it is
arguable that a Court majority endorsed the constitutionality of faculty
diversity as a goal. Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, stated that
"although its precise contours are uncertain, a state interest in the
promotion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at
least in the context of higher education, to support the use of racial
consideration in furthering that interest." 77 Justice Marshall, in his
dissent joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, stated that he would
have upheld the school board's policy under the lower standard of
intermediate scrutiny. 7H The dissent by Justice Stevens recognized the
need for an integrated faculty, stating: "In the context of public
education, it is quite obvious that a school board may reasonably
conclude that an integrated faculty will be able to provide benefits to the
student body that could not be provided by an all-white, or nearly allwhite, faculty." 79
70.

/d.

71.

!d. at 27.1.

n.

/d. at 274-f\4 (pluralitv).

73.

ld. at 274.

74.

ld.

75.

!d. at 273.

76.
77.
311-15)
78.
79.

ld. at 274-76.

!d. at 2f\6 (O'Connor, ]., concurring) (citing Justice Powell's opinion in Bukke, 438 U.S. at
Id. at 301- 03 (MarshalL Brennan, & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
!d. at :l15 (Stevens,]., dissenting).
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Although the affirmative action plan was struck down in Wygant,
another plan was upheld during this same time period. In United States v.
Paradise, 80 the Supreme Court upheld a court -ordered promotion policy
implemented because of a four-decade documented history of racial
discrimination against blacks in the Alabama Department of Public
Safety. 81 Justice Brennan's plurality opinion stated that "[t)he
Government unquestionably has a compelling interest in remedying past
and present discrimination by a state actor." 82 The Court did note,
however, that the remedial plan should be "temporary in application." 83
When analyzing affirmative action policies, the Paradise Court
considered the following five factors: the necessity for relief and the
efficacy of alternative remedies; the use of a rigid racial quota or a flexible
racial goal; the duration of the relief; the numerical goals; and the impact
of the relief on third parties. 84 These factors may be weighed against each
other and some may be more heavily relied upon than others. 85 Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell concluded that racial
preferences could be used when the five factors were met. 86 Justice
Stevens concurred on the grounds that the district court had equitable
power to fashion a broad remedy in a particular case where a
constitutional violation had been found. 87 The Supreme Court also noted
that the race-conscious promotion requirements were flexible because
they could be waived if no qualified candidate was available. 88
After Paradise, there seemed to be a shift in the Court's affirmative
action employment cases beginning with City of Richmond v. f.A. Croson
Companl 9 when the Court struck down a race-conscious program. In
this case, Richmond had a contract set-aside program for minorityowned businesses. 90 This program required prime contractors to
subcontract at least 30 percent of the dollar amount of each construction
contract to minority-owned businesses. 91 The Court held that because
the city could not identify a broad need for remedial action in the area of

80.

U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).

HI. Sec Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 74 (N.D. Ala. l'lll3), alfd, 767 1'.2d 1514 (lith
Cir. 1%5), a[fd su/J nom. U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
82.

Paradise, 480 U.S. at 167 (plurality).

S3. !d. at 178.

84.

/d. at 171-86.

85.

Jd.
/d.

86.

87. Id. at 189-95 (Stevens,)., concurring).
SS.

!d. at 177 (plurality).

89. City of Richmond v. ].A. Croson Co., 48S U.S. 469 (1989).
90.

Id. at 477-7S.

9 I.

I d. at 477.
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government contracts, the plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 92 According to the Court, the city's setaside program was not narrowly tailored and 93 unlike previous cases,
there was not enough evidence of prior discriminationY 4
Given the lack of evidence demonstrating a need for a remedial plan,
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated that the consideration
of race in such programs "may in fact promote notions of racial
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility." 95 Accordingly, the
Court noted that the consideration of race could be justified if the
program operated to remedy past wrongs against a group. 96 However,
the evidence of discrimination must be strong enough to demonstrate the
government's need to remedy the discrimination: "[A] generalized
assertion that there has been past discrimination in an entire industry
provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope
of the injury it seeks to remedy." 97
The Court upheld a race-conscious plan based on a lower level of
scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting v. Federal Communications
Commission. 98 In Metro Broadcasting, a Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) program sought to ensure viewpoint diversity by
permitting television stations and radio stations to be controlled by
minority-run companies. 99 Specifically, in creating such a program, the
FCC reasoned that a racially diverse group would lead to more diverse
perspectives. 100 The FCC implemented this policy to " [enrich] and
[educate] the non-minority audience." 101 In its lawsuit, Metro
Broadcasting alleged that the policy violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 102
Under intermediate review, the Court upheld the FCC's policies. The
Court reasoned that "[t]he Commission's minority ownership policies
bear the imprimatur of longstanding [sic] congressional support and

92. Id. at 511.
93.

I d. at 505-08.

94.

I d. at 485.

Id. at 493 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298).
96. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
97. Id. at 498. The Croson Court also noted that race-neutral plans could have been explored
and established. Sec id. at 509-10.
98. Metro Broad. v. FCC.• 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled, Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (l99S); Metro
Broad was overruled to the extent that the Court incorrectly used mid-level scrutiny, instead of strict
scrutiny. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
95.

99. 497 U.S. at 555.
I 00.

!d. at 5o6.

101.

Jd.556.

I 02.

/d. at SSS-60.

44
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direction and are substantially related to the achievement of the
important governmental objective of broadcast diversity." 103 For the
majority, Justice Brennan stressed the importance of diversity in
broadcasting and noted that it was a constitutionally permissible goal. 104
The Court reasoned that racial classification would withstand
intermediate scrutiny if it did not impose undue burdens on nonminorities.105 Justice O'Connor's dissent reiterated her stance in Croson
regarding the justification of race-based programs, stating that such
programs are only acceptable if they operate to remedy past wrongs
against a group. 106
Again applying strict scrutiny, in Adarand Construction v. Pena, the
Court rejected a plan whereby a company under a U.S. government
contract would receive additional compensation if the company hired
minority-owned subcontractors. 107 The contracts were obtained as a
result of the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance
Act of 1987. 108 The Act stated that "not less than I 0 percent" of the
appropriated funds "shall be expended with small business concerns
owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals." 109 The Court rejected the proposition that affirmative
action was necessary in this particular situation, but did note that
110
affirmative action could be permissible to remedy past discrimination.
In striking down this affirmative action program, the majority opinion
stated: "[t]he unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering
effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is
an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in
response to it." 111 Thus, Adarand shows that the Court did not strike
down affirmative action policies in all cases.
Before the Gratz and Grutter Supreme Court decisions, legal scholars
argued over what type of influence the public employment affirmative
action cases would have on education cases. After Grutter and Gratz,
some scholars argue that the Supreme Court may choose to "uphold
race-conscious policies in employment contexts that closely parallel the
higher education context," or use race as a plus factor. 112 This line of
103.

!d. at

104. !d. at

600.
568 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-13).

105. !d. at 596-97
106. !d. at

107.

603 (O'Connor,)., dissenting).

505 U.S. at 201-06 (majority).

100-17,101 Stat. 132 (1987).
101 Stat. at 145.

108. Pub. L. No.
109.

110. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 218-21.
Ill. !d. at 237.

112. See )oint Statement, supra n. I 0 ,\I 25.
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reasoning would be consistent with Justice O'Connor's reasoning in
Wygant and Grutter when she reiterated that higher education is
different than employment.
Evidence of past discrimination must be provided in order to meet
the compelling state interest standard in public employment cases. 113 To
satisfy this requirement, the government should have evidence of
discrimination against each racial group included in the race-conscious
policy. 114 For example, when the Croson Court struck down the raceconscious policy, it did so because the city did not have enough evidence
of discrimination to support the constitutional scrutiny required under
the Equal Protection Clause. 115 Therefore, when a university uses a raceconscious hiring plan to remedy past discrimination, the institution
needs to have concrete evidence. 116 Some scholars argue that if a
university cannot rely upon past societal discrimination as a basis for
race-conscious policies, the university can "focus solely on present effects
of past discrimination at that particular institution." 117 Concrete
evidence would also be necessary in this situation.
V. OTHER NOTAHLE RACE AND FACULTY CASES: WHAT Do THESE
OUTCOMES ADVANCE?

Although this paper focuses on Supreme Court holdings, there are
other cases that address race-conscious hiring of faculty and teachers,
including one federal circuit court of appeals case, 118 one federal district
court case, 119 and one state supreme court case. 120 The circuit court case
addressed affirmative action at the K-12 level, while the federal district
court case and the state supreme court case addressed affirmative action
at the university leve\. 121
The federal circuit court case examined the issue of race-conscious
employment practices to achieve teacher diversity. In Taxman v. Board of
Education of the Township of Piscataway, a white high school teacher was
laid off by the school board in favor of retaining a black teacher, who
113. See Jeffrey M. Hanson, Hanging By Yarns' Dcjiciencies in Anecdotal Eviderzce Threaten the
Survival of Race-Based Preference Programs/or Public Contracting, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1433, 1435-38
(2003).
114. 488 U.S. at 506.
115. !d. at 485
116. !d.
117. Alger,supran.31,at 192.

Taxmarz v. Bd. o{Educ. of the Township of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547(3d Cir. 1996).
Hmwdle v. U. of Vt. & St. Agric. College, 56 F. Supp. 2d 419 (D. Vt. 1999).
120. U. & Community College, 930 P.2d at 733.
121. Taxman, 91 F.3d 1547; Honadle, 56 F. Supp. 2d 419.

118.

119.

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

46

[2005

happened to be the only black teacher within that particular
department. 122 The district court granted partial summary judgment for
the plaintiffs Title VII claim holding that the school board's action was
overly intrusive on the rights of non-minorities. 123 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision but focused on and rejected the
school board's non-remedial objective to maintain a diverse faculty as
inconsistent with the intent of Title VII's prohibition of racial
discrimination. The court reasoned that non-remedial objectives are not
permissible grounds for a race-conscious employment plan under Title
VII. The court, relying on United Steelworkers v. Weber 124 and Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 125 reasoned that a plan must seek to rectify
under-representation, not to promote diversity. 126
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari; but due to a last-minute
settlement, the case never reached the high court. 127 This would have
been the first Supreme Court case to focus on faculty diversity as a
compelling state interest. 128
In Honadle v. University of Vermont and State Agricultural College,
129
a professor applicant alleged reverse discrimination when the
University used race as a hiring factor. The applicant moved for
instatement to a position that the University filled with a minority
candidate. 130 The court found that the University's affirmative action
plan did not violate the Equal Protection Clause or Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act. 131 Specifically, the court reasoned that a fund used to give
departments incentive to hire minorities was not problematic. 132
Although the court refused to instate the denied applicant, the court did
note that if the plaintiff could successfully prove that race influenced the
decision to hire the minority employee, then the University's affirmative

122.

Taxman. 91 F.3d at 1551.

123.

U.S. v. Bd. ofi'.duc. of the Township of Piscataway. 832 f. Supp. 836,851 (D.N.f. 1993).

124. 443 U.S. 139 ( 1979).
125. 480 U.S. 616 (1987)
126.

Taxman. 91 F.3d at 1558.

127. Cert. granted in Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ. V. Taxman, 521 U.S. 1117 ( 1997), cert.
dismissed, 552 U.S. 10!0 (1997).
128. Some scholars argue that this case was f(lrced to settlement by pro-affirmative action
groups who feared that this was a weak test case and as such the Supreme Court would have struck
down the school's affirmative action program. See Matthew S. Lerner, When Diversity Leads to
Adversity: The Principles of Promoting Diversity in Educational Institutions, Premonitions of the
Tax man v. Board of Education Settlement, 47 Buff. L. Rev. I 035, I 046-47 (1999).
129. 56 f. Supp. 2d 419.
130.

Id. at 424-30.
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action plan may have been unconstitutional. 133
The Nevada Supreme Court addressed a case involving the issue of
race-conscious hiring practices to achieve faculty diversity. In University
and Community College System of Nevada v. Farmer, a white female
professor alleged that the University discriminated against her when it
hired a black professor. 134 The black immigrant professor from Uganda
was hired under a special minority program that allowed a department to
hire an additional faculty member if it hired a minority candidate. 135
When hiring faculty, the University argued that it based its decision on
the candidate's publications, teaching, subject specialization, educational
background, and race. 136
The Nevada Supreme Court upheld the University's race-conscious
faculty hiring policy in order to achieve diversity and remedy the effect of
an apparent racial imbalance in a traditionally segregated job category. 137
The Court noted that at the time of this decision, almost 90 percent of the
faculty was white. 138 The Court relied on Bakke and reasoned "[t]he
University demonstrated that it has a compelling interest in fostering a
culturally and ethnically diverse faculty. A failure to attract minority
faculty perpetuates the University's white enclave and further limits
student exposure to multicultural diversity." 139 Additionally, the Court
stated that "[w]e also view the desirability of a racially diverse faculty as
sufficiently analogous to the constitutionally permissible attainment of a
racially diverse student body countenanced by the Bakke Court." 140
Because the two candidates were fairly equal in merit, the University
should have some discretion in making personnel decisions. 141 Although
this case is only binding in Nevada, it demonstrates how universities rely
on Bakke, and arguably on Grutter and Gratz, in finding faculty diversity
a compelling interest.
These cases are of particular importance because they demonstrate
how the lower courts interpret diversity in employment regarding
teachers and professors. It is unfortunate that these cases never reached
the U.S. Supreme Court. Guidance is still needed in considering race
when hiring university faculty.
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Formerly, many institutions established affirmative action plans to
remedy present dfects of past discrimination in faculty hiring. Some
universities may now, as a result of Grutter and Gratz, seek to sustain
these programs to achieve educational benefits of diversity. Therefore,
even if one argues that narrowly defined vestiges of past discrimination
have been eliminated at some institutions, the diversity rationale seen in
these e<1ses remains an important justification for race-conscious faculty
hinng as a matter of educational quality for the institution.

VI.

POLICY ARJ;UMENTS: SHOULD RACE BE CONSIDERED IN FACULTY
HIRINC;?

Although the arguments above focus on what is permissible under
the law, there are several policy-based arguments that merit discussion.
Two of these arguments are that a diverse faculty is related to important
educational objectives and that diverse faculty members could serve as
role models for both students and faculty.
Universities arc premised upon the creation of a holistic learning
environment as part of the institution's educational mission, promoting a
sense ot community among faculty and students who engage in a "robust
exchange of ideas" both inside and outside the classroom. 142 One could
argue that universities are institutions where people from diverse
backgrounds come together to learn from one another. Some scholars
believe that "racial and ethnic diversity among [university] faculty ...
serves important educational objectives." 143 For example, faculty
members not only influence through teaching, but also through research,
writmg, and service activities. Through these actions, a diverse faculty
and teaching staff play a pivotal role in breaking down stereotypes and
Improving race relations on campus and ultimately nationally. 144
faculty members serve as important role models for students and
faculty. Although the role model theory was dismissed in Wygant, there
arc other issues to consider at a university. Under the faculty role model
theory, when minority students witness minority faculty succeed, it may
demonstrate to them that such achievement is possible in higher
education. VVhitc students who have not regularly encountered members
of minority groups in positions of authority may also benefit. 145 Diversity
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l!il'<'nitv m ,, Clinim/ legal J:'dumtion l:npcrativc, 51 Hastings Lj. 445, 466 (2000).

DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION

33]

49

at a university can raise cultural awareness for all involved. 146
Furthermore, the presence of minority faculty tends to make students of
color feel that they are welcome in the institution. A "critical mass" of
people of color can be quite beneficial. 147
The significance of faculty diversity does not depend on the "false
notion that there is an essential voice of persons of color" or that a faculty
member's race dictates his or her particular way of thinking about one
subject. 148 Instead, the idea is that people of different races and
ethnicities often have different life experiences that affect their relations
with members of other groups and influence their views on the subjects
they teach. 149 A professor's background impacts the way he or she
perceives the world. Paul Brest and Miranda Oshige use the example that
African Americans regularly encounter discrimination not experienced
by whites. Expanding the Brest and Oshige arguments, imagine the
difference between a class discussion on racial profiling in an all-white
lecture and a similar class discussion in a racially diverse lecture. The
discussions would be very different in each setting and arguably more
fruitful in the latter setting. Brest and Oshige write: "Policies that seem
'neutral' to a dominant group may have quite different meanings for
members of other racial or ethnic groups. This has important
implications both for the interpersonal and intellectual lives of students
and faculty." 150
Critics argue that consideration of race in faculty hiring equals
reverse discrimination. 151 Other concerns, as mentioned in the Farmer
dissent, involve how affirmative action plans consider faculty of mixedancestry or minority immigrant faculty members. In Farmer, it could be
argued that the black professor, as an immigrant, was never
disadvantaged by past discrimination. Under this reasoning, the remedial
argument present in the public employment cases would not apply. After
Adarand, one could argue that a university's motive in considering race
in faculty hiring does not meet the requisite standard that remedies be
narrowly tailored to address specific instances of past discrimination.
However, it is equally arguable that professors who have lived abroad
would certainly contribute to the learning environment on campuses.
Currently, most data is in regard to student body diversity. But, some

146. See generally Alexander W. Astin, What Matters in College? Four Critical Year.< Revisited,
(Jossey-Bass 1992) (reviewing the college satisfaction experiences of20,000 students).
147. Sec Brest, supra n. 145, at 856 n. 4.
148. Dubin, .<upra n. 145, at 456 (citing Brest, supra n. 142, at 862).
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of the arguments for student body diversity could extend to maintaining
a diverse faculty. 152 Jonathan Alger, counsel to the American Association
of University Professors, notes that the presence of a diverse faculty can
enhance the learning opportunities for white students, but recognizes
there is little data to prove such a claim. 153 Alger does, however, note that
researchers are currently studying diversity at the campus and national
levels. 154 In a survey of current research on diversity, the Association of
American Colleges and Universities reported that diversity initiatives
positively affect both minority and white students on campus. 155 These
studies indicate that "diversity initiatives have an impact not only on
student attitudes and feelings toward inter-group relations on campus,
but also on institutional satisfaction, involvement, and academic
growth." 156 Alger suggests that in future research, "the link between
educational quality and legal standards must be explored and articulated
in a manner that courts will understand and accept if race-conscious
affirmative action programs are to survive." 157
VII. CONCLUSION
Most progressive educational systems seek to support a diverse
faculty and to provide an educational setting that encourages diversity.
Oftentimes, universities adopt affirmative action programs in faculty
hiring. Some universities implement such programs to remedy past
discrimination, while other universities implement these plans to
increase diversity. Whatever the underlying purpose for the affirmative
action plan, there are different legal issues to consider. If a university
seeks a diverse faculty under the principles articulated in Grutter and
Gratz, questions remain as to whether this line of reasoning extends to
faculty hiring. Alternately, if the university seeks to remedy past
discrimination, the public employment cases dictate the need to
152. For instance, the Harvard Civil Rights Project demonstrated that students graduating
from higher-tier law schools "experienced powerful education experiences from interaction with
students of other races." See Gary Orfield & Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education: Student
Experiences in Leading Law Schools, in Diversity Challenged: Evidence of the Impact of Affirmative
Action 143, 172 (Gary Orfield & Michal Kurlaender eds., Harvard Educ. Publg. Group 2001). Their
research also found that exposure to diverse student bodies permitted the white law students to have
an improved understanding of the critical dimensions of their profession. !d.
153. Alger, supra n. 31, at 194.
!54. jonathan R. Alger, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Unjlnished Homework Jar
Universities: Making the Case for Affirmative Action, 54 Wash. U.). Urb. & Con temp. L. 73, 80-81
(1998).
155. Jd. at 76.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 77.
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assiduously document past forms of discrimination to each particular
group. Until the Supreme Court gives further guidance on faculty
diversity, some universities will continue to use race as a factor in faculty
hiring to increase faculty diversity or to remedy past discrimination.

